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THE COMFORT OF CERTAINTY: PLAIN
MEANING AND THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
Peter Linzer*
It is an honor to take part in this Festschriftfor Joseph M. Perillo,
scholar of contract law and friend and mentor to so many contracts
teachers and practitioners. As the General Editor of the Revised
Edition of Corbin On Contracts, Professor Perillo is advancing
contracts scholarship on the widest scale. He has, of course, also
made many important contributions to specific areas of the subject.
In particular, with his longtime collaborator, the late John D.
Calamari,Professor Perillo contributed a famous article, A Plea For

a Uniform Parol Evidence Rule and Principles of Contract
Interpretation, 42 Ind. L.J. 333 (1967), to the literature of contract
interpretation. I have been revising Corbin's discussion of the parol
evidence rule, so I have the benefit of Joe both as editor and as fellow
scholar. I hope that this essay does him justice.

I. NEITHER HOLY NOR ROMAN: PLAIN MEANING AND THE PAROL
EVIDENCE RULE(S)

Underlying the dreaded parol evidence rule' is the notion that
words have plain meanings. The list of contracts authorities that have
. Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. A.B., Cornell, 1960, J.D.,
Columbia, 1963. Editorial Revisor, Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981);
author of Volume 6 of the Revised Edition of Corbin On Contracts (Interpretation:
The Process of Implication and the Parol Evidence Rule) (forthcoming 2004). Many
colleagues, both at the University of Houston and throughout the country, took the
time to read drafts and gave me valuable comments. Among them are: Seth
Chandler, Steve Huber, John Mixon, Nancy Rapoport, Susan Martin, Jim Mooney,
and David Snyder. University of Houston law students Stewart Patton, Shannon
Herrington-Smith and especially Melissa D. Astala gave me invaluable help in the
research for this essay. I dedicate the essay to my wife, Rhea Stevens, Esq., who, in
addition to her emotional and professional support, unplugged my laptop minutes
before our property was struck by a lightning bolt that would have fried the essay the
day before it was due.
1. It is obligatory at this point to quote Thayer on the parol evidence rule: "Few
things are darker than this, or fuller of subtle difficulties." James Bradley Thayer, A
Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 390 (1898). Wigmore quoted
Thayer and added: "[A]nd this condition of the law all members of the profession will
concede.... [I]t is not strange that the so-called Parol Evidence rule is attended with
a confusion and an obscurity which make it the most discouraging subject in the
whole field of Evidence." 5 John Henry Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 2400, at
235-36 (2d ed. 1923).
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denied or derided the concept of plain meaning is long, very long,2 and
Professor Margaret Kniffin, in her revision of the chapter of Corbin
On Contracts dealing with interpretation, created a twenty-five page
section attacking the concept and stating that the judicial trend is to
abandon it.' Yet Professor Kniffin was too honest a scholar not to
admit an important truth. Buried in the midst of this section is one
sentence that gives the game away: "the 'plain meaning rule' is
adhered to by a majority of the jurisdictions in the United States."4
Professor Arthur L. Corbin discussed the plain meaning rule in his
chapter on interpretation,5 and argued that the parol evidence rule
had nothing to do with interpretation.6 Corbin's reasoning ran as
follows: the parol evidence rule means only that, if the parties agree
that a written document will be the exclusive contract between them,
they necessarily terminate and supersede any earlier agreements,
whether written or oral.7 While this later "integration" bars evidence
of earlier agreements, which are no longer valid, it does not bar
extrinsic evidence of its own meaning, even if that interpretation is
different from the "plain meaning."'
Corbin's position is fully
2. See, e.g., 3 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin On Contracts § 542, at 108-10 (rev.
ed. 1960) [hereinafter 3 Corbin On Contracts 1960 ed.] ("There are, indeed, a good
many cases holding that the words of a writing are too 'plain and clear' to justify the
admission of parol evidence as to their interpretation.... Such statements assume a
uniformity and certainty in the meaning of language that do not in fact exist; they
should be subjected to constant attack and disapproval."); 9 John Henry Wigmore,
Evidence § 2462, at 198 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1981) ("The fallacy consists in
assuming there is or ever can be some one real or absolute meaning." (emphasis
omitted)); see also John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts §
3.10, at 148 (4th ed. 1998); E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.12, at 476 (3d ed. 1999);
5 Margaret N. Kniffin, Corbin On Contracts § 24.7, at 30 (Joseph M. Perillo ed.,
1998); John Edward Murray, Jr., Murray On Contracts § 86 (4th ed. 2001); Arthur L.
Corbin, The Interpretationof Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 Cornell L.Q. 161
(1965) [hereinafter Corbin, Interpretation of Words]; Oliver Wendell Holmes, The
Theory of Legal Interpretation,12 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 417 (1899).
3. Kniffin, supra note 2, § 24.7. The section is based on several sections in the
original treatise. See 3 Corbin On Contracts 1960 ed., supra note 2, §§ 535, 536, 542;
see also Margaret N. Kniffin, A New Trend in Contract Interpretation: The Search for
Reality As Opposed to Virtual Reality, 74 Or. L. Rev. 643 (1995).
4. Kniffin, supra note 2, § 24.7, at 34.
5. The sections cited in note 3 appear in the interpretation chapter of both the
1960 edition of Corbin On Contracts, 3 Corbin On Contracts 1960 ed., supra note 2,
and Professor Kniffin's 1998 revision, 5 Margaret N. Kniffin, Corbin On Contracts §
24.7 (rev. ed. 1998).
6. Kniffin, supra note 2, § 24.11 is entitled "Interpretation of Contracts
Distinguished from Application of The 'Parol Evidence Rule."' It is based on the
1960 edition of Corbin On Contracts, 3 Corbin On Contracts 1960 ed., supra note 2, §§
539, 576, 579.
7. 3 Corbin On Contracts 1960 ed., supra note 2, § 539.
8. No parol evidence that is offered can be said to vary or contradict a
writing until by process of interpretation it is determined what the writing
means. The "parol evidence rule" is not, and does not purport to be, a rule
of interpretation or a rule as to the admission of evidence for the purpose of
interpretation. Even if a written document has been assented to as the
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supported by other distinguished writers, including Allan Farnsworth9
and John Murray," as well as by the more recent editions of
Williston's treatise.1" The only problem with this approach is that
stated by Professor Perillo,
The logic of this dichotomy is unassailable, so is its impracticality.
The very same words offered as an additional term that are rejected
because the court deems the writing to be a total integration, can be
offered as an aid to interpretation of an ambiguous written term.
Able courts look at both proffers of evidence as governed by the
"parol evidence rule." 2
Thus, the parol evidence rule and the plain meaning rule are
conjoined like Siamese twins. Even though many academics and more
than a few judges have tried to separate them, the bulk of the legal
profession views them as permanently intertwined. 3
I would like to examine these two concepts, and try to understand
why courts and lawyers stick to them. Of course, not all their
defenders are thoughtless. Recent scholarship, particularly by law and
economics types, has shown considerable support for plain meaning
and for a rigid parol evidence rule. Again, however, figuring out the
reasons for such support can help us to decide if it is time for
academics to catch up with practitioners, or vice versa.
The concept of plain meaning, while it has some variations, is pretty
straightforward. Most courts that find plain meaning to exist do not
spend a lot of time explaining what they mean by it, even in odd
situations such as that in the famous Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. G.
W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.,14 where the trial court and the

complete and accurate integration of the terms of a contract, it must still be
interpreted; and all those factors that are of assistance in this process may be
proved by oral testimony.
3 Corbin On Contracts 1960 ed., supra note 2, § 579, at 412-13; see also Kniffin, supra
note 2, §§ 24.11-.12.
9. Farnsworth, supra note 2, at 427, 452 (signaling a distinction in his subchapter
headings, calling Chapter 7, Part B, "Determining the Subject Matter To Be
Interpreted, and Part C, "Interpretation"); see also Calamari & Perillo, supra note 2, §
3.9, at 147 n.6.
10. Murray, Jr., supra note 2, § 85(A); see also Calamari & Perillo, supra note 2, §
3.9, at 147 n.7.
11. 4 Williston, Contracts § 631 (3d ed. 1961); but see 4 Williston § 632 (3d ed.
1961); see also Calamari & Perillo, supra note 2, § 3.9, at 147 n.8.
12. Calamari Perillo, supra note 2, § 3.9, at 148.
13. 1 was for a number of years a member of a committee of the Texas State Bar
that wrote standard jury charges for contract cases. The other members were
distinguished judges and lawyers, very thoughtful and knowledgeable about contract
law. One day someone used the term "plain meaning" and I said that there was no
such thing. When my comment was greeted with incredulity I offered to show my
colleagues articles by Corbin and Farnsworth. My offer was politely declined and I'm
sure everyone else in the room thought that I was just a fuzzy intellectual with no
grasp of law as it really existed.
14. 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

intermediate appellate court found different-and conflicting- plain
meanings. 5
In contrast, the parol evidence rule has many variations. In fact,
like that political anachronism, the Holy Roman Empire, the parol
evidence rule fits none of the words in its name: it is not limited to
parol-that is, oral-testimony, it is not evidentiary, and it is not
really a rule. Even its most basic rationale is strongly disputed: is it an
adjunct to the Statute of Frauds, designed to discourage self-serving
oral testimony, or does it merely express a presumption that the last
statement of the parties' words supersedes what came before, a
presumption that may easily be displaced by other evidence, oral or
written? There have been extravagances on both sides (assuming
there are only two) of the issues. Even assuming that we can figure
out how to state the parol evidence rule(s), we then need to ask why
we have them and how they fit with the presence or absence of a
concept of plain meaning. Perhaps if we knew more about the
underlying rationales suggested for various versions of the rule, and,
even more interesting, the psychology of those who support one
position or another, we might be better able to decide what rules we
want, and why.
The inquiry involves psychology, philosophy and politics, as well as
the more mundane aspects of contract interpretation. The questions
raised by both the parol evidence and plain meaning rules mirror
political and social views having nothing to do with contract
interpretation.
The rationale is intimately connected with an
underlying psychology in which certainty and stability battle with
party autonomy and intent. On the side of strong reliance on the
written document there is a range of emotional and instrumental
justifications. A strict parol evidence rule combined with a strong
view of plain meaning gives some people psychic comfort as well as
predictive stability. It is reassuring to believe that the words on a page
provide order, and order is unquestionably comforting. 6
Writers on semantics, linguistics, philosophy generally, and literary
criticism have all spent a lot of time on meaning in general and plain
meaning in particular, but the eyes of lawyers and judges glaze over
when these discussions are mentioned. While legal writers have often
15. This is described in Harry G. Prince, Contract Interpretation In California:
Plain Meaning, Parol Evidence and Use of the "JustResult" Principle, 31 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 557, 577-78 (1998). It is not mentioned in the Supreme Court's opinion, but can
be seen in the report of the Court of Appeal decision, 62 Cal. Rptr. 203 (Ct. App.
1967).
16. In discussing positivism and referring to the great German-American legal
philosopher, Hans Kelsen, who was neither a fool nor a reactionary, Lon Fuller
mentioned "Kelsen's casual admission, apparently never repeated, that his whole
system might well rest on an emotional preference for the ideal of order over that of
justice." Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to ProfessorHart, 71
Harv. L. Rev. 630, 632 & n.1 (1957).
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debated issues of intent, particularly in matters of constitutional and
statutory interpretation, with the exception of H.L.A. Hart 7 and Lon
Fuller, 8 few have gone very deeply into the meaning of plain
meaning.
In its most rigid form, the plain meaning rule bars extrinsic evidence
unless the word is ambiguous on its face. The flaw in plain meaning is,
of course, the notion of a latent ambiguity. Everyone concedes that
such things exist, and a few piquant examples are often cited, for
example, In re Soper's Estate, 9 a Minnesota case in which a man had
bought a life insurance policy payable to his "wife." "Wife" is a pretty
clear word, and the man had only one wife, but extrinsic evidence
showed that he had deserted her and pretended suicide, and was living
with another woman when he entered into the insurance contract.
The court concluded that he intended to make the second woman his
beneficiary, despite the fact that she was not legally his "wife" and
another woman was. Similarly, in Raffles v. Wichelhaus, ° the famous
case of the two ships Peerless, the name of the ship on which the
cotton was to arrive was clear on the face of the contract, and the
existence of another ship also named Peerless2 became apparent only
by extrinsic evidence. Holmes tried to fit Raffles into his objective
theory of interpretation because it involved a name,22 and perhaps he
could have fitted Soper in as well, but it is not hard to find similar
ambiguities involving ordinary words. Consider a contract providing
that a certain act must be done "in the same month" as a demand.
The complaint states that a demand was made on June 3 and that the
act was performed on June 30, but payment was not made. Extrinsic
evidence might show, however, that months of the Islamic or Jewish
calendar were intended and that the day corresponding to June 3 was
in a different month from the day corresponding to June 30.
A rather homey illustration of latent ambiguity can be found on a
cereal box. On the nutrition information panel of the side of
Shredded Wheat boxes is a notice reading "Not a low calorie food."
This is surprising because all unsweetened dry cereals have about 100
calories per ounce of weight. However, Shredded Wheat is a fairly
dense cereal, so a cup of it weighs considerably more than a cup of a
17. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L.
Rev. 593 (1957).
18. Fuller, supra note 16.
19. 264 N.W. 427 (Minn. 1935); see Kniffin, supra note 2, § 24.7, at 31-32.
20. 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864).
21. Actually, we are told by A.W. Brian Simpson that there were nine British
ships named "Peerless," and two more from America, plying the seas in 1863, when
the contract was made. See A.W. Brian Simpson, Contracts for Cotton to Arrive: The
Case of the Two Ships Peerless, 11 Cardozo L. Rev. 287, 295 (1989).
22. Holmes, supra note 2, at 418. For a skeptical assessment of Holmes's efforts at
objectifying Raffles, see Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 45-47 (Ronald K.L.
Collins ed., 1995).
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cereal such as Puffed Wheat, which is mostly air. The densest cereal,
Grape Nuts, has about the same number of calories by weight as
Puffed Wheat, but a cup of it weighs about ten times as much and has
more than ten times as many calories.23 Is it a higher calorie cereal?
Because we do not eat air, we can make a strong argument that the
two cereals have the same amount of calories, but since we tend to eat
a bowlful at breakfast we can also argue the opposite.2 4 Although
"[n]ot a low calorie food" seems perfectly understandable on its face,
the phrase is actually filled with ambiguity, ambiguity that becomes
apparent only with the aid of extrinsic evidence of weight, volume and
eating habits.
While a rigid plain meaning rule is a poor reason for restrictions on
extrinsic evidence, one can add a genuine instrumental justification:
strict rules protect against the fear that the more we allow the words
of a contract to be challenged in the name of the parties' actual intent,
the more we produce disorder or even chaos, waiting to be exploited
by unscrupulous litigants who demand a bonus to do what they
already promised to do. This, in turn, leads to a different form of
comfort. Strict rules satisfy those who feel that, if you learn the rules
and follow them, you should be assured that they will be applied
firmly and without exception, even if this produces a result that
appears unfair in the short run. According to this view, fairness is
whatever result the rules produce, because in the long run
predictability and invariance usually make for just results.
More "liberal" rules give a different sort of comfort, one in which
justice appears to trump formalism 25 although even among those who
dislike a strict parol evidence rule, there are many who still want to
protect contract stability. While they reject a rigid exclusion of
extrinsic evidence, they would, in fact, admit the evidence only if the
judge found it "reasonably susceptible" of the meaning for which it
was offered, thus allowing a judge to reject it on the merits with
relative ease. Others find this an unacceptable compromise with
formalism, because it still prefers the written word to the proffered
evidence of the parties' intent. The partisans of various positions are

23. According to the side panels of both cereals, Grape Nuts is about 0.07 higher
in calories by weight, but 10.5 limes higher in calories by volume. One ounce by
weight of Grape Nuts has about 101 calories while one ounce of Puffed Wheat has
about 93.4 calories. One and one-quarter cups of Puffed Wheat weighs 15 grams (just
over half an ounce) and contains 50 calories. One-half cup of Grape Nuts weighs 58
grams (just over two ounces) and has 210 calories. Therefore, one cup of Puffed
Wheat would weigh 12 grams (0.42 ounces) and have 40 calories while one cup of
Grape Nuts would weigh 116 grams (4.14 ounces) and contain 420 calories!
24. Incidentally, Puffed Wheat is about three times as expensive by weight as
Grape Nuts.
25. The most honest statement of this position was made by Professor Harry
Prince. Prince, supra note 15, at 578-80.
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often uncompromising in their advocacy of a position 2 6-evidence, in
my view, of the deeply emotional component of the issue.
What we call the parol evidence rule is better thought of as a
spectrum. Some courts, old and new, presume that almost all
27
documents, however skimpy or haphazard, represent the final word.
Others will not go that far, but still apply Williston's famous "four
corners rule" strictly, rejecting extrinsic evidence unless questions of
integration and ambiguity of meaning are patent on the face of the
writing.2"
Other courts, although they recite the four corners
approach, actually require the facial uncertainty to be much less
palpable, and admit extrinsic evidence more readily.29 Still others
allow extrinsic evidence to show non-integration and ambiguity
themselves,3 " and some even go as far as the Restatement (Second) of
26. Compare Corbin's disdain for "semantic stone walls," Corbin, Interpretationof
Words, supra note 2, at 186-88, with Judge Alex Kozinski's rather shrill attack on
what he saw as an impossibly loose California standard, Trident Ctr. v. Conn. Gen.
Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 568-70 (9th Cir. 1998). With respect to the California
standard, compare Roger Traynor's flights of fancy in Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v.
G. W. Thomas Drayage Co., 442 P.2d 641, 643 n.2 (Cal. 1968), the second of the
famous 1968 trilogy of cases that appeared to some to have completely eviscerated the
Rule in California, with the dissent of Justice Burke to Traynor's opinion in
Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 567-71 (Cal. 1968), the first of the three cases. For a
more modest, and thoughtful, criticism of a loose parol evidence rule, see the dissent
of Justice Stanley Mosk to the third case of the trilogy, Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto,
446 P.2d 785, 789-90 (Cal. 1968). Justice Mosk joined in the first two opinions. Most
of these authorities are discussed in the body of this essay.
27. This approach, finding a roughly drawn document to be an integration, can be
observed in cases that are a century apart. See the bill of sale in Thompson v. Libbey,
26 N.W. 1 (Minn. 1885), bare bones and apparently handwritten, and the release in
Hershon v. GibraltarBuilding & Loan Ass'n, 864 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1989), done by a
"cut-and-paste approach," "obviously cobbled together from form books," and
rushed to completion because a party was anxious to leave for Europe. Id. at 854-55
(Williams, J., dissenting).
28. See, e.g., Savik v. Entech, Inc., 923 P.2d 1091, 1093-94 (Mont. 1996) (finding no
facial ambiguity and refusing to allow in extrinsic evidence to show that "those
benefits that are afforded to other employees under Entech's employment policies"
included permanent employment, rather than just fringe benefits (internal quotations
omitted)). Not as extreme but still remarkably rigid is the opinion of the
distinguished Justice Ellen Peters in Tallmadge Brothers v. Iroquois Gas Transmission
System, 746 A.2d 1277,1289 (Conn. 2000):
We decline to abandon the basic principle of contract law that we construe
contract language by reference to the words chosen by the parties.
Especially in the context of commercial contracts, we assume that definite
contract language is the best indication of the result anticipated by the
parties in their contractual arrangements.
29. See Gerdlund v. Elec. Dispensers Int'l, 235 Cal. Rptr. 279, 282-86 (Ct. App.
1987); Prince, supra note 15, at 605-09.
30. See, e.g., Masterson, 436 P.2d at 563-66 (admitting extrinsic evidence to show
integration); Pac. Gas, 442 P.2d 641 (admitting extrinsic evidence of ambiguity); Ward
v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995) (admitting extrinsic
evidence of ambiguity). A strange amalgam can be found in Admiral Builders
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. South River Landing, Inc., 502 A.2d 1096, 1098-1101 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (allowing collateral evidence to be admitted to show an
ambiguity, but forbidding its use to vary, alter or contradict the writing's "clear
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Contracts and admit evidence to show meaning without regard to
ambiguity.3" Often lower courts stick to older, more rigid rules and

ignore, or at least do not follow, liberalizing cases from their state's
supreme court.32
The parol evidence rule serves a legitimate end. We enter into
written contracts to avoid disputes in the future, and if every contract
were simply the beginning point in a testimonial battle, we would gain
little by writing things down. But the written word is not as infallible a
guide as some think, and people often do not read agreements and
often do believe themselves protected when they are told "don't
worry about that clause."3 3 A detailed survey will reveal countless
variations around the country and remarkable gradations of what
seem to be fixed rules, even within a given jurisdiction. And even the
most rigorous versions of the rule admit many exceptions and allow
oral proof of matters such as oral conditions,34 evidence of fraud or
mistake,35 and collateral agreements.36

meaning").
31. See, e.g., Municipality of Anchorage v. Gentile, 922 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1996);
Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 854 P.2d 1134 (Ariz. 1993); Att. N. Airlines
v. Schwimmer, 96 A.2d 652 (N.J. 1953); Berg v. Hudesman, 801 P.2d 222 (Wash.
1990).
32. See, for example, Student Loan Guarantee Foundation v. Barnes, Quinn, Flake
and Anderson, Inc., 806 S.W.2d 628 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991), in which the Arkansas
Court of Appeals refused to admit extrinsic evidence on the question whether a
parking lot used in connection with an office building could be "office space" within
the meaning of a real estate brokerage contract. The court of appeals relied solely on
dictionary definitions of "office," although it cited an Arkansas Supreme Court
decision, C & A Construction Co. v. Benning Construction Co., 509 S.W.2d 302 (Ark.
1974), which said that extrinsic evidence would be admissible when latent ambiguities
arose "from undisclosed facts or uncertainties of the written instrument." Id. at 303.
For examples of the California Courts of Appeal not following the California
Supreme Court, see Prince, supra note 15, and Susan J. Martin-Davidson, Yes, Judge
Kozinski, There Is a Parol Evidence Rule in California-The Lessons of a Pyrrhic
Victory, 25 Sw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1995). A similar, if perhaps somewhat wishful,
description of lower Utah courts is contained in Mark 0. Morris and Elizabeth
Evensen's article, What's Happening to the Parol Evidence Rule? More Holes In the
Dike, 67 Def. Couns. J. 209 (2000).
33. 1 recall being about to sign an apartment lease and calling the manager's
attention to a provision requiring window curtains to have a white backing. I
mentioned that I had curtains that did not have the required backing and she said,
"Oh, they don't enforce that rule." I went ahead and signed the lease, but thought to
myself how foolish I would look in landlord-tenant court if "they" tried to evict me, a
contracts teacher who tried to rely on an oral contradiction of the "plain words" of
the lease. At least I knew that I would have to rely on the landlord's grace (or
indifference). A non-lawyer would assume that she could enforce the manager's
assurance.
34. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 217 (1981); 3 Corbin On Contracts
1960 ed., supra note 2, § 589.
35. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214(d) (1981); 3 Corbin On
Contracts 1960 ed., supra note 2, § 580.
36. See 3 Corbin On Contracts 1960 ed., supra note 2, § 594.
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So, instead of a parol evidence "rule," there is a continuum of many
different approaches, all using the same name and often using the
same words. In 1967 the young Joe Perillo joined Professor John D.
Calamari to complain that
[T]here is no uniform parol evidence rule. Rather, there are at least
two rather dissimilar rules which, for convenience, may be
denominated the Corbin Rule and the Williston Rule. In view of
the confusion engendered by having two contradictory rules
expressed in the same terminology, it is remarkable that a few states
have shown a degree of consistency. New York, despite some
inconsistent cases, generally maintains a rigorously Willistonian
approach. Rhode Island seems recently to have adopted the Corbin
Some states, such as
approach with a Willistonian touch ....
Connecticut, reach results consistent with Corbin's test, while
utilizing the most varied reasoning. Perhaps most states are
consistently erratic. Such is the confusion that in any state a
in result and analysis, or
decision may be reached which is ludicrous
37
sensible in result but strained in analysis.
More than thirty years later, the even younger Eric Posner, after
sketching out what he called the "hard-PER" (roughly the Williston,
four-corners, plain meaning approach) and the "soft-PER" (roughly
that of Corbin and the Second Restatement of Contracts), 38 cautioned
his readers that they
[S]hould, for now, understand that the reality is more complex than

the stylized versions of the parol evidence rule developed for the
purpose of analysis. Although some jurisdictions use something like

the hard-PER, while other jurisdictions use something like the softPER, many jurisdictions take different and often conflicting
approaches to the treatment of extrinsic evidence.

In some

jurisdictions, for example, the courts adopt a hard attitude toward
the incompleteness exception, while taking a soft attitude toward the
ambiguity exception. In other jurisdictions, the courts do the
opposite .... In addition, within a single jurisdiction, the parol
evidence rule may vary considerably over time.... In virtually every
jurisdiction, one finds irreconcilable cases, frequent changes in
doctrine, confusion, and cries of despair.3 9

In trying to make sense of these variations we must ask why a given
court chooses a particular form of the parol evidence rule. Often the
answer appears to be nothing more than ignorance or sloppiness, but
at other times the motivation of the courts is discernible and worth

37. John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, A Plea For a Uniform Parol Evidence
Rule and Principles of Contract Interpretation, 42 Ind. L.J. 333, 343-44 (1967)
(footnotes omitted).
38. Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the
Principles of ContractualInterpretation,146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 533, 534-38 (1998).
39. Id. at 538-40 (footnotes omitted).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

discussing. I will attempt to make some sense by looking at a number
of way-stations along the continuum.
II. THE TRUE BELIEVERS

We might start with those who take the strictest view, applying the
"plain meaning" of the words of a contract despite strong evidence of
the parties' contrary intentions. An example of this is one of my
favorite bad decisions, the majority opinion in Hershon v. Gibraltar
Building & Loan Ass'n" Hershon was a diversity case in which the
D.C. Circuit purported to be applying Maryland law. Simon Hershon
and Anton Vierling, together with some associates and family
members, had had many business dealings with Lawrence B.
Goldstein, who owned the Gibraltar Bank.
Eventually, the
relationship turned sour and the parties became embroiled in five
different lawsuits. On August 24, 1984, the many parties, including
Simon Hershon, his brother Leo, Leo's wife, and Vierling and his
wife, settled with Goldstein and Gibraltar and entered into a "Mutual
Release and Discharge Agreement" (the "Release"), which provided
in Paragraph 2 that the parties released and discharged each other
"absolutely, unconditionally and forever.., from any and all
Claims"4 that each ever had against the other. The term "Claims"
was defined in Paragraph 1(d), in familiar boiler-plate language, as
[A]ny actions, causes of action, suits, debts, dues, liens, sums of
money, accounts, reckonings, specialities, covenants, promises,
judgments, expenses, costs, attorneys' fees, liabilities, claims for
relief, proceedings, debts, contracts, damages, defenses, obligations,
responsibilities, demands and interest of any kind or nature
whatsoever,42 known or unknown, tangible or intangible, fixed or
contingent.

In mid-September, several weeks after the Release had been signed,
it dawned on the Hershons and Vierlings that they all owned
apartments in the Admiral Dupont condominiums in Washington,
D.C., with their promissory notes subject to deeds of trust held by
Gibraltar, and that on a literal reading of the Release, they were freed
of nearly $300,000 of debt on the three condominiums, debts that had
never been in dispute. They all had made the monthly payments due
on September 1, 1984, and Vierling had even tried to refinance his
loan a few days after the Release was signed, but now they asserted
that their obligations had been discharged by the Release. Gibraltar
threatened to declare the notes in default and to accelerate the debts,
and the borrowers and their wives sought determinations that their
liability had been released. The suits, originally filed in the Superior
40. 864 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
41. Id. at 849.
42. Id.
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Court for the District of Columbia, were removed to the United
States District Court on diversity grounds and later consolidated.
Paragraph 11 of the Release specified that the case was governed by
Maryland law, and there does not seem to have been any dispute over
the choice of law. 3
The district judge found an ambiguity on the face of the Release
and admitted extrinsic evidence showing that the condominiums were
not part of the settlement.4 The ambiguity came from the fact that
Paragraph 4 of the Release said that it was expressly agreed that the
Release "is, and shall be, a full and complete termination, settlement
and satisfaction of any and all Claims alleged and matters in dispute
in" the five pending cases between the parties. 45 Moreover, Paragraph
12, the merger clause, recited that it was an integration of all promises,
etc., "with respect to Gibraltar, IFS, 633 JV and/or M-AFSLP,"
described by the court as "being four among the more than twenty
individuals, corporations, and partnerships listed in paragraph 1(a)
and (b) as 'Releasees' or 'Dischargees.' ' 46 To the district court this
suggested that the global definition of "Claims" in Paragraph 1(d)
could be read as limited by the more restrictive language in the later
paragraphs, creating an ambiguity on the face of the Release.47 In
addition, the district court allowed extrinsic evidence of the debtors'
conduct after the Release was signed, namely that they all made the
September payments and that Vierling tried to renegotiate the terms
of the loan.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in an opinion by Judge
James Buckley, joined by Judge Harry Edwards. Judge Stephen F.
Williams dissented. Judge Buckley began his discussion of the parol
evidence rule by saying that
Maryland has consistently refused to adopt the "subjectivist"
approach championed by Arthur Corbin, the American Law
Institute, and our dissenting colleague. Instead, it adheres to the
traditional "objective" test in interpreting contracts: where an
agreement's language is clear, judges must give effect to its plain
meaning, as understood by reasonable people in the parties'
position-regardless of what the parties subjectively thought or
intended. Where contractual terms are unambiguous, resort to
extrinsic evidence is barred.48

43. Id. at 851.
44. Id. at 850-51.
45. Id. at 850.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 851. The dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals relied on the maxim,
"ejusdem generis" (words are read in the context of those around them), id. at 855-56
(Williams, J.,dissenting). Paragraphs 4 and 12 also call forth the maxim "expressio
unius est exclusio aherius" (the expression of one is the exclusion of others).
48. Id. at 851 (citations omitted).
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The district court had relied on a Maryland intermediate appellate
court decision, Admiral Builders,49 which, in Judge Buckley's own
words, "had ruled that a trial judge may consider extrinsic evidence
both to determine whether a contract ambiguity existed (unless that
evidence varied, altered, or contradicted the writing's clear meaning)
and to resolve any ambiguity by ascertaining the parties' intent."5
Judge Buckley, however, said that Admiral Builders "requires that
extrinsic evidence reveal an ambiguity in the contract's language and
prohibits the use of parol evidence to contradict the clear, ordinary
meaning of the contract's words,"'" and held that the district court
"failed to identify any facts or external evidence to support its
conclusion that the Release was facially ambiguous-a point conceded
by appellees at oral argument."52 The incoherence of the use of
extrinsic evidence to show facial ambiguity is apparent, and the
dissent shows pretty effectively that Admiral Builders, the Maryland
appellate case relied on by both opinions, did not require this
oxymoron.5 3 The real thrust of the majority opinion is a combination
of an extreme view of plain meaning and a strict insistence on playing
by what the majority considered to be the rules:
We find nothing in paragraphs 4 or 12 that can reasonably be
interpreted to except the Dupont obligations from the expansive
reach of paragraph 6, which declares that "[e]xcept as herein set
forth, it is the specific intent and purpose of the parties.., to release
and discharge each and the other from any and all Claims of any
kind or nature whatsoever,. . . whether specifically mentioned herein

or not." The fact that paragraph 4 listed pending litigation, or that
the integrated documents referred to in paragraph 12 settled certain
disputed matters and debts, does not mean that obligations and
documents not expressly mentioned or integrated were not released.
Clearly, if the parties had intended to exclude the Dupont notes and
deeds from the scope of the Release, it was incumbent upon them to

49. Admiral Builders Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. S. River Landing, Inc., 502 A.2d 1096
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).
50. Hershon, 864 F.2d at 851.
51. Id. at 852.
52. Id. The dissent disputed both the existence of this alleged concession and its
legal relevancy. See id. at 856 n.1 (Williams, J., dissenting).
53. As the court here correctly notes, Maryland subscribes to the standard
precept that the parol evidence rule requires that evidence which "'varies,
alters, or contradicts the clear meaning of the writing' be excluded from the
fact-finder. Id. at 852 (quoting Admiral Builders, 502 A.2d at 1100). But the
court does not dispute the offsetting precept of Maryland law-that extrinsic
evidence is relevant to identifying the existence of an ambiguity within the
language of the contract. Id. at 851-52 (citing the famous Peerless case, Raffles
v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864)); see also Admiral Builders, 502
A.2d at 1099-1100 (noting that it is correct to use extrinsic evidence in making
the "primary" finding of ambiguity).
Id. (Williams, J., dissenting). To some extent, the dispute over Admiral Builders may
turn on what is meant by the words "within the language of the contract" and
"primary" finding of ambiguity.
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identify those debts explicitly, as they did in paragraph 2 with
respect to certain accounting bills. 54 Appellees must accept the
consequences of their failure to do so.
It is worth noting that Judge Buckley does not say that, had the
parties intended to exclude the Dupont notes, they presumably would
have identified them explicitly. He asserts that, if this was their
intention, "it was incumbent upon them" to do so. The parties did
not follow the rules as he understood them, and that was the end of
the matter. It was irrelevant that the Release was "obviously cobbled
together from form books, 5 6 that "Paragraph 1(d) most patently
illustrate[d] the cut-and-paste approach by gratuitously repeating the
term 'debts,"' 57 and that the maxim, ejusdem generis, while typically
used for words in proximity to each other, could be applied to read
the "broad general terms"5 of Paragraph 4 in light of the narrower
ones of Paragraph 12, which, eight paragraphs later, was on the same
topic. None of these facial anomalies was sufficient even to put the
issue of interpretation into play.
The paragraph just quoted from the majority opinion is striking not
because it resolves the issues against the bank-maybe the Hershons
and Vierlings were justified in their arguments-but rather because it
did not allow arguments about facial ambiguity to be considered. By
refusing to allow anything other than what the majority saw as plain
meaning to be considered, the majority was able to review what it
considered to be a decision of law under a de novo standard; had the
court of appeals viewed the question of facial ambiguity as a factual
question, it would have had to limit its review of the trial judge's
decision to a clearly erroneous standard, which would have been much
harder to justify. 9 And, of course, if the majority had allowed the
extrinsic evidence to be considered on the question of ambiguity, it
certainly would have been limited to "clearly erroneous" review. The
dissent, which found a facial ambiguity and also independently
determined that the extrinsic evidence was proper to consider under
Maryland law," concluded as follows:
Thus, still assuming that the language of the Release and the
documents executed under Paragraph 12 did not alone establish an
ambiguity, the critical question would be simply whether those facts,
54. Hershon, 864 F.2d at 852-53.
55. Id. at 853.
56. Id. at 854-55 (Williams, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 855 (Williams, J., dissenting).
58. Id. (Williams, J.,
dissenting).
59. Compare the majority's argument on this point, id. at 852, with that of the
dissent, id. at 858 (Williams, J., dissenting). In Admiral Builders the Maryland Court
of Special Appeals upheld the trial judge by using the clearly erroneous standard of
review. Admiral Builders Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. S. River Landing, Inc., 502 A.2d 1096,
1099 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).
60. Hershon, 864 F.2d at 856-58.
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together with the events before and after execution of the Release,
undermine the borrowers' claim that it unambiguously released
them from their condominium loans.6'

I have no idea who the good guys and the bad guys were in this
case, but I have no doubt that the decision is wrong. Maybe Goldstein
and his bank deserved to get done out of nearly $300,000, but even the
majority had to concede that this result was nothing that the parties
63
had in mind.62 Unlike some of the famous parol evidence rule cases,
the argument against "plain meaning" in Hershon is not fanciful, yet
the majority is almost atavistic in refusing to consider the bank's
interpretive argument. Given the gaps in the Release and the debtors'
actions in making loan payments after signing the Release, not to
allow a factfinder to consider what the parties intended by the word
"Claims" is to go back to a sporting view of law. Even more, this
approach resurrects a romantic world that never existed, a nevernever land where there is always plain meaning and certainty,' 4 even if
achieved only by turning deals upside down."
When Ronald Reagan appointed him to the D.C. Circuit, James
Buckley, who wrote the majority opinion in Hershon, was better
known as Bill Buckley's brother than as a great legal mind. It is
tempting to view his Hershon opinion as a one-dimensional
application of the unsubtle values that Buckley had espoused during
his one term in the United States Senate. However, we have to
remember that his opinion was joined by Judge Harry Edwards, a
highly respected judge and a professor at Michigan before Jimmy
Carter put him on the bench. There is no way to caricature Judge
Edwards as a legal Neanderthal, and the dissenting Judge Stephen
Williams was also a Reagan appointee.

61. Id. at 857-58.
62. "We acknowledge that the application of the objective test and its corollary,
the parol evidence rule, can lead to harsh consequences, and this may well be such a
case." Id. at 853.
63. E.g., Trident Ctr. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988);
Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
64. Thayer's other famous aphorism is about the
lawyer's Paradise where all words have a fixed, precisely ascertained
meaning; where men may express their purposes, not only with accuracy, but
with fulness; and where, if the writer has been careful, a lawyer, having a
document referred to him, may sit in his chair, inspect the text, and answer
all questions without raising his eyes.
James Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise On Evidence at the Common Law
428-29 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co., 1898).
65. Immediately following the words quoted above, see supra note 62, the court
continued, "Nonetheless, it is fundamentally important that parties be able to rely on
the explicit language of written contracts. The public interest in certainty and finality
is too critical to allow every agreement to be subjected to collateral attack." Hershon,
864 F.2d at 853.

2002]

THE COMFORT OF CERTAINTY

One can make similar observations about the venerable New York
case of Mitchill v. Lath,66 in which the Laths, sellers of a parcel of land,
orally promised Mrs. Mitchill, the buyer's wife, that they would
remove an unsightly icehouse that they apparently owned on an
adjoining parcel owned by a third party. Nothing about this promise
appeared in either the contract for sale between the Laths and Mr.
Mitchill or the deed by which they transferred the parcel directly to
Mrs. Mitchill. The Laths later refused to make good on their promise,
and Mrs. Mitchill sued.
The trial court ordered specific performance and the Appellate
Division affirmed, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed in an
opinion by Judge William Andrews. The Court of Appeals did not
dispute the fact that the sellers had made the oral promise. The only
issue was whether its enforcement was barred by the parol evidence
rule. Judge Andrews did not formally state the rule, but there seems
to be little doubt that he would have agreed with the dissent's
statement of the rule:
There is a conclusive presumption that the parties intended to
integrate in that written contract every agreement relating to the
nature or extent of the property to be conveyed, the contents of the
deed to be delivered, the consideration to be paid as a condition
precedent to the delivery of the deeds, and indeed all the rights of
the parties in connection with the land. The conveyance of that land
was the subject-matter of the written contract, and the contract
completely covers that subject.6 7
The disagreement between the majority and the dissent is over the
issue of how to determine whether the oral promise was "collateral"
to the written contract.68 Judge Andrews posits conditions that govern
the issue, the most critical being that the agreement "must be one that
parties would not ordinarily be expected to embody in the writing."69
Also, he focuses on "[h]ow closely bound" the oral agreement was
with the later written agreement: "[A]n inspection of this contract
shows a full and complete agreement, setting forth in detail the
obligations of each party. On reading it, one would conclude that the
reciprocal obligations of the parties were fully detailed."7 Andrews
did say that surrounding circumstances might be considered, but his
discussion of them was limited to a single sentence, in which he said
that "[t]he presence of the icehouse, even the knowledge that Mrs.
Mitchill thought it objectionable, would not lead to the belief that a
separate agreement existed with regard to it."71
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

160 N.E. 646 (N.Y. 1928).
Id. at 648 (Lehman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 646-47, 648-50 (Lehman, J., dissenting).
Id. at 647.
Id.
Id.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

In contrast, Judge Irving Lehman, writing in dissent, stated the issue
in terms of the parties' actual intent. Quoting Wigmore, he wrote
that,
[t]o determine what the writing was intended to cover, "the
document alone will not suffice. What it was intended to cover
cannot be known till we know what there was to cover. The
question being whether certain subjects of negotiation were
intended to be covered, we must compare the writing and the
negotiations
before we can determine whether they were in fact
72
covered."
Judge Lehman, who would soon succeed Cardozo as Chief Judge,
and who is viewed as one of the giants of the New York Court of
Appeals, has the better of the argument. Judge Andrews and the
other members of the 6-1 majority in Mitchill seemed to have no
doubt that Mrs. Mitchill and the Laths had, indeed, agreed that the
Laths would remove the icehouse, yet the court refused to hold the
Laths to their promise. Unlike Judge Buckley, Judge Andrews enjoys
a high reputation (torts students still study his dissent in Palsgrafv.
Long Island R.R. Co.,73 and compare it, often favorably, with Judge
Cardozo's majority opinion). In addition, other than Judge Lehman,
all the members of the New York Court of Appeals, including
Cardozo, joined Andrews in applying the parol evidence rule. The
Court of Appeals, then at the peak of its prestige and quality, was
certainly not a bunch of legal lightweights seeking comfort in a false
stability. Thus, we may have to look further at the question of
motivation.

III. AND NOW A WORD FROM CALIFORNIA
In contrast to Mitchill, where everyone seems to have agreed that
the Laths made the oral promise to remove the icehouse, and
Hershon, where it is pretty clear that the parties had not intended the
Release to include the condominium notes, many other parol
evidence rule cases involve inherently unlikely stories by parties who
look like they are trying to renege on the deal they made. An
example is an opinion by Alex Kozinski, another Reagan circuit
judge, one whose legal ability is unquestioned, even by those who are
not of his political outlook. In his famous opinion in Trident Center v.
Connecticut General Life Insurance Co.,V" Judge Kozinski was dealing
with two prominent Los Angeles law firms that had borrowed $56
million in 1983 at 12 % interest to finance an office building project.
By 1987, interest rates had dropped sharply, but the note stated that
72. Id. at 649 (quoting 5 John Henry Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 2430 (2d
ed. 1923)).
73. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
74. 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988).
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"[m]aker shall not have the right to prepay the principal amount
hereof in whole or in part" before January 1996, twelve years into the
fifteen year loan.75 The law firms sought a declaratory judgment that,
despite the prepayment ban, they could still pay off the mortgage at
an early date by defaulting and then paying off the accelerated
indebtedness plus a ten percent prepayment fee. The firms sought to
offer extrinsic evidence to support this reading of the acceleration
provisions of the loan agreement,76 but the trial judge, treating their
argument with the disdain it probably deserved, dismissed their action
and assessed Rule 11 sanctions 77 on their attorneys for filing a
frivolous law suit.7" On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. Because
federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, the federal
courts were, of course, bound by Erie v. Tompkins 9 to apply the law
that would have been applied by the appropriate state court, in this
case, California's, and Judge Kozinski held that California case law
entitled the plaintiffs to a chance to prove their case. He also held
that, given the California precedents, the attorneys could not be held
to have violated the rules by filing their complaint."0
Had Judge Kozinski stopped there, no one would remember
Trident. In fact, the decision might not even have been published.
But Kozinski seized the opportunity to read to the California
Supreme Court a lecture in what he thought the California parol
evidence rule should be. His principal bete noir was the second of the
three famous parol evidence rule opinions written by Roger Traynor
in 1968, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage &
Rigging Co. :81
Two decades ago the California Supreme Court in Pacific Gas...
turned its back on the notion that a contract can ever have a plain
meaning discernible by a court without resort to extrinsic evidence.
The court reasoned that contractual obligations flow not from the
words of the contract, but from the intention of the parties....
Under Pacific Gas, it matters not how clearly a contract is
written, nor how completely it is integrated, nor how carefully it is
negotiated, nor how squarely it addresses the issue before the court:
the contract cannot be rendered impervious to attack by parol
evidence. If one side is willing to claim that the parties intended one
thing but the agreement provides for another, the court must
consider extrinsic evidence of possible ambiguity.... We question
whether this approach is more likely to divulge the original intention
75. Id. at 566 (alteration in original).
76. Id. at 568.

77. Id. at 566, 570; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
78. Trident, 847 F.2d at 570.
79. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Trident, 847 F.2d at 570.

80. Trident, 847 F.2d at 568-70.
81. 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).
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of the parties than reliance on the seemingly clear words they agreed
upon at the time.
Pacific Gas casts a long shadow of uncertainty over all
transactions negotiated and executed under the law of
California....
It also chips away at the foundations of our legal system....

... With the benefit of 20 years of hindsight, the California
Supreme Court may wish to revisit the issue. If it does so, we
commend to it the facts of this case as a paradigmatic example of
why the traditional rule, based on centuries of experience, reflects
the far wiser approach. 2
Judge Kozinski's opinion in Trident has had many devotees, 3 but it
has always struck me as remarkably impertinent, given the passive
role assigned by Erie to the federal courts in diversity cases.8 4 In
addition, several courts and writers of various political hues have
criticized his reading of Pacific Gas and the other California parol
evidence rule cases.85 Why, then, did he make such a strong attack?
In part, we may attribute it to his genuine irritation at the chutzpah of
these wealthy and highly skilled law firms in putting forth so unlikely
a story with a straight face. In part, Kozinski may have seen these
facts as giving him an excuse to attack a rule that bothered his sense of
decorum as much as it would have bothered James Buckley's. Or
perhaps he was genuinely concerned about the opportunity that the
California cases seemed to give to the unscrupulous to attempt to
rewrite contracts unilaterally and after the fact. This was the reason
that he put forth, and in support of it he cited the dissent of the
distinguished and liberal Justice Stanley Mosk, who had joined the
82. Trident, 847 F.2d at 568-70.
83. See, e.g., Olivia W. Karlin & Louis W. Karlin, The California Parol Evidence
Rule, 21 Sw. U. L. Rev. 1361, 1375 (1992) ("potent and incisive"); L. Gordon Crovitz,
Saving Contracts From High Weirdness, Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 1988, at 16, reprinted in
Peter Linzer, A Contracts Anthology 423 (2d ed. 1995) ("one judge campaign to
restore both common law and judicial restraint"). Mr. Crovitz appears quite bright
and his title is entertaining, but he is not a lawyer and obviously has no understanding
of Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
84. On this point, see Prince, supra note 15, at 583-85.
85. See, e.g., Bank v. Truck Ins. Exch., 51 F.3d 736, 737-38 (7th Cir. 1995)
("exaggerated concern"); Banco do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc., 285 Cal. Rptr. 870, 893
& n.53 (Ct. App. 1991) ("unfortunate" and "inaccurate"); Martin-Davidson, supra
note 32, at 16-19, 71 ("Judge Kozinski's 'error' in Trident Center was two-fold: first, in
thinking that California does not have a parol evidence rule, and, second, in thinking
that it should."); Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74
Or. L. Rev. 1131, 1154 n.123 (1995) ("mocking, mean-spirited"); Prince, supra note
15, at 585 ("exaggerated misreading"). Other criticisms are cited in Prince, supra note
15, at 585 n.151.
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first two of Traynor's three 1968 opinions, but dissented in the last,
saying
[g]iven two experienced businessmen dealing at arm's length, both
represented by competent counsel, it has become virtually
impossible under recently evolving rules of evidence to draft a
written contract that will produce predictable results in court. The
written word, heretofore deemed immutable, is now at all timees
[sic] subject to alteration by self-serving recitals based upon fading
memories of antecedent events. This, I submit, is a serious
impediment to the certainty required in commercial transactions.86
So here we have a Reagan Republican and a Jerry Brown
Democrat agreeing on something that sounds neither psychological
nor particularly philosophical, a common sense feeling that people
should not be allowed to chisel their way out of written contracts. At
this point it makes sense for us to look at those three California cases
and their progeny, to see if they do indeed give bad men a second bite
of the apple, and if they do, to figure out why Roger Traynor, called
the "ablest judge of his generation" by no less than Henry Friendly, 7
was willing to give them that second bite.
Chief Justice Traynor's three 1968 opinions have been the subject
of many studies. In a sense, all three cases could have been decided
on grounds that would not have changed the parol evidence rule one
whit.
Instead, they have become the best known and most
controversial cases on the topic. Yet their holdings have been
misstated by many writers, both supportive and critical. The first case,
Masterson v. Sine,88 was essentially the mirror image of Mitchill v.
Lath,s9 the 1928 New York icehouse case. Like Mitchill, Masterson
involved a claim of an oral collateral agreement that supposedly
modified a subsequent written real estate transaction that made no
reference to it.9" In Masterson, however, the very existence of the oral
agreement was disputed, along with its admissibility under the parol
evidence rule.91
Dallas Masterson and his wife, Rebecca, had conveyed a ranch to
Dallas's sister Medora Sine and her husband Lu.92 The deed reserved
an option in the Mastersons to repurchase the ranch for the "same
consideration as being paid heretofore plus the depreciation value of
any improvements" made by the grantors. 93 When Dallas went
bankrupt, his trustee and Rebecca sought to exercise the option so
86. Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto, 446 P.2d 785, 789-90 (Cal. 1968) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
87. Henry J. Friendly, Ablest Judge of His Generation,71 Cal. L. Rev. 1039 (1983).
88. 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
89. 160 N.E. 646 (N.Y. 1928).
90. Masterson, 436 P.2d at 562.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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that they could sell the ranch, which had apparently appreciated in
value, but Dallas and the Sines proffered Dallas's testimony that the
parties had wanted the ranch to stay in the family and that the option
to repurchase was thus personal and non-assignable, testimony that
the trustee and Rebecca objected to on parol evidence rule grounds.94
As in Mitchill v. Lath, the issue in Masterson was not one of
interpretation; it was simply whether there was a collateral agreement
that supplemented, rather than contradicted, the terms of the written
deed.95 Like Corbin, 96 Judge Traynor saw the collateral agreement
issue as whether the written document was fully integrated: did the
parties intend to supersede the alleged oral agreement? Older
California cases had said that integration had to be determined solely
from the face of the instrument, with the court asking itself if the
document appeared to be a complete agreement. 97 Traynor, however,
said that the courts had not applied these criteria consistently, and ran
through a number of rationales for the parol evidence rule: a belief
that written evidence is more accurate than human memory, fear of
fraud or self-interested delusion, and protection against jury sympathy
for the underdog. 9
Traynor then stated a new rule, which, in his opinion, satisfied the
various policies.99 According to Traynor, "[e]vidence of oral collateral
agreements should be excluded only when the fact finder is likely to
be misled.""' He then mentioned the tests of the first Restatement
(evidence is not barred if it is in an agreement that might naturally
have been made as a separate agreement)"' and the Uniform
Commercial Code (evidence is to be excluded only if it certainly
would have been included in writing)," 2 and flirted in a footnote with
Corbin's suggestion that a collateral agreement could even be found
when it would not be natural for the parties to have made such an
agreement, "if the court is convinced 1 that
the unnatural actually
3
happened in the case being adjudicated." 0
94. Id. Ironically, when the trustee and Rebecca offered extrinsic evidence to
explain the meaning of "same consideration" and "depreciation value," Dallas and
the Sines objected on the same grounds. Both the trial court and the California
Supreme Court agreed that the parol evidence rule was no bar to this explanation of
the language of the deed. Id. at 562-63. In fact, even the dissenters in the Supreme
Court agreed that this evidence was not barred by the parol evidence rule. id. at 567.
95. See id. at 567 (Burke, J., dissenting).
96. See 3 Corbin On Contracts 1960 ed., supra note 2, § 594, at 564-67 (Burke, J.,
dissenting)..
97. Masterson, 436 P.2d at 563.
98. Id. at 564.
99. Id.

100. Id.
101. Restatement of Contracts § 240(1)(b) (1932).
102. U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 3 (2000).
103. Masterson, 436 P.2d at 565 n.1 (citing 3 Corbin on Contracts 1960 ed., supra
note 2, § 485 [sic; should be § 584], at 478, 480).
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After running through the facts (no merger clause, deed silent on
assignability, family transaction, deed an awkward place to put the
side agreement, parties inexperienced), he concluded that the
collateral agreement satisfied both the lenient test of the Uniform
Commercial Code and the stricter test of the first Restatement, and
found it not barred by the parol evidence rule. A long and bitter
dissent by Justice Burke argued both that the story of the bar on
assignment was a fraud and that the majority's holding subverted the
parol evidence rule and would lead to "confusions and inconsistencies
which will arise to plague property owners and, incidentally, attorneys
' 4
and title companies, who seek to counsel and protect them. '""
From one point of view, Masterson does not seem to change the law
that much, given that it applies Williston's thirty-six year old first
Restatement test along with looser, more modern tests. From another
perspective, Traynor's new basic rule, that "[e]vidence of oral
collateral agreements should be excluded only when the fact finder is
likely to be misled,""" is a major change. After all, in Mitchill v. Lath
there was no dispute over the authenticity of the icehouse agreement,
but even Judge Lehman did not dispute the basic point that the
written agreement was dominant. In addition to Traynor's less than
reverential approach to the parol evidence rule, Masterson's
importance comes from the fact that Dallas Masterson's story is
inherently unbelievable." 6 The dissent makes a great deal over the
self-serving nature of Dallas's story, and if the purpose of the parol
evidence rule is to prevent fraud, the dissent makes a good case that
his testimony should be excluded. But as Traynor pointed out, citing
McCormick On Evidence, that reasoning would exclude all oral
testimony whenever a writing exists." 7
It is worth remembering that we allow juries to hear all kinds of tall
tales in tort cases, leaving it to their common sense to sort the true
from the false. The fact that Masterson's testimony about the alleged
oral agreement was allowed into evidence does not mean that the trier
of fact had to believe it. To exclude evidence of this nature is to
distrust juries. Assuming hypothetically that Masterson could have
produced a signed and notarized side agreement that the option was
104. Id. at 574 (Burke, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 564; see supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
106. Aside from the fact that the restriction on the option apparently was never
told to anyone before Dallas went bankrupt, the most striking fact is that there was no
restriction on Dallas's selling the property to a stranger after he exercised the option.
Thus, even if the option were not assignable, Dallas could have gotten around the
alleged restriction to family members by selling the property after he exercised the
option. There was only one circumstance in which this two-step process would not
work-a bankruptcy. For another skeptical view of Dallas's story, see Marvin A.
Chirelstein, Concepts and Case Analysis in the Law of Contracts 92-93 (4th ed. 2001).
107. Masterson, 436 P.2d at 564 (citing Charles T. McCormick, Law of Evidence §
210 (1st ed. 1954)).
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to be non-transferable, it is difficult to see why such a document
should be excluded. That the agreement here, if it even existed, was
oral makes an immense difference factually, but should not affect the
parol evidence rule question. If we ignore our suspicions and leave
the fact question to the jury, we are left with an opinion that agrees
with Judge Lehman's dissent in Mitchill v. Lath, a dissent that has
aged well. Neither Masterson nor Mitchill explicitly addresses why a
prior oral agreement should be excluded if its existence is not in
doubt. The reason, according to Corbin, is that the parties' later
agreement may have superseded it. Traynor seems to be saying
implicitly that, if it makes sense (under one of the tests for collateral
agreements) that the parties intended the side agreement to survive
the later writing, the jury ought to get to hear about the oral
agreement, and decide for itself whether to believe the self-serving
story."" Yes, Masterson is an important case, but it is far from a
radical one.
It is the second case of the 1968 trilogy, Pacific Gas and Electric Co.
v. G. W. Thomas Drayage Co., °9 that has excited the most comment.
It is unquestionably an important way-station in the evolution of the
parol evidence rule, and a major authority against the plain meaning
concept. In some ways Pacific Gas is quite radical, yet it basically
walks a middle ground. Ironically, Pacific Gas could have been
decided on a narrower and totally uncontroversial ground-that the
four corners of the document showed a patent ambiguity. Chief
Justice Traynor went out of his way to expand the means of finding an
ambiguity and then added some very intriguing-and provocativedicta that rejected the idea of plain meaning. The combination has
made Pacific Gas a favored target of those who would go back to the
good old days.""
In Pacific Gas, G.W. Thomas, a contractor hired to replace the
cover of a steam turbine owned by PG&E, agreed to "'indemnify'
plaintiff 'against all loss, damage, expense and liability resulting
from.., injury to property, arising out of or in any way connected
with the performance of this contract.'.''
During the course of the
project, the cover fell and damaged an exposed rotor of the turbine.
PG&E sued Thomas for more than $25,000 on both a negligence
theory, which it withdrew at trial, and the indemnification clause.
PG&E obtained a judgment based on the theory that the
indemnification language covered PG&E's own losses as well as any
damages that it had to pay to third parties. At trial, Thomas offered
to prove "by admissions of plaintiff's agents, by defendant's conduct
under similar contracts entered into with plaintiff, and by other proof,
108.
109.
110.
111.

Accord Chirelstein, supra note 106, at 93-94.
442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).
See supra text accompanying notes 81-85.
Pacific Gas, 442 P.2d at 643.
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that in the indemnity clause the parties meant to cover injury to
property of third parties only and not to plaintiff's property.' 1 2 The
trial court held that the plain meaning of the word "indemnify" barred
any extrinsic evidence of a narrower meaning.113 Strangely, the trial
court conceded that the clause used "the classic language for a third
party indemnity," but still found that the plain meaning of
"indemnify" required Thomas to reimburse PG&E for its losses, and
that any attempt to limit this plain meaning
would be contradictory
14
and would violate the parol evidence rule.'
After stating this background, Traynor immediately described the
trial court's actions in Corbin's language. He said that "[w]hen a court
interprets a contract on this basis, it determines the meaning of the
instrument in accordance with the '. . . extrinsic evidence of the
judge's own linguistic education and experience," ' .5 and continued by
stating that "[t]he exclusion of testimony that might contradict the
linguistic background of the judge reflects a judicial belief in the
possibility of perfect verbal expression. This belief is a remnant of
primitive faith in the inherent potency and inherent meaning of
words.""' 6 This was strong language to begin with, but it also had the
support of Corbin and Wigmore, whom Traynor cited." 7 At this
point, however, Traynor threw in a famous footnote, which a writer in
the Wall Street Journal later characterized as an example of "1960s
judges citing moonbeam legal evidence," in "what may be the single
weirdest footnote in the history of U.S. courts.""... The footnote reads,
E.g., "The elaborate system of taboo and verbal prohibitions in
primitive groups; the ancient Egyptian myth of Khern, the
apotheosis of the word, and of Thoth, the Scribe of Truth, the Giver
of Words and Script, the Master of Incantations; the avoidance of
the name of God in Brahmanism, Judaism and Islam; totemistic and
protective names in mediaeval Turkish and Finno-Ugrian languages;
the misplaced verbal scruples of the 'Prdcieuses'; the Swedish
peasant custom of curing sick cattle smitten by witchcraft, by making
them swallow a page torn out of the psalter and put in
dough .... 119

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. Even stranger, the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the plain
meaning of "indemnify" could not include reimbursement of the indemnitee's own
losses. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 62 Cal. Rptr.
203, 204-05 (1967). The California Supreme Court made no comment about the
Court of Appeals's actions. Pac. Gas, 442 P.2d at 643-48.
115. Pac. Gas, 442 P.2d at 643 (quoting 3 Corbin, Corbin On Contracts § 579 (1960
ed. Supp. 1964)).
116. Id. at 643-44 (citing 9 John Henry Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 2461, at
187 (3d ed. 1940)).
117. Id.
118. Crovitz, supra note 83, at 16, reprintedin Linzer, supra note 83, at 423.
119. Pac. Gas, 442 P.2d at 643 n.2 (quoting Stephen Ullman, The Principles of
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Now this footnote may be a bit over the top, but the authorities it
cites are not moonbeam, and its point is not foolish. Chief Justice
Traynor is implicitly saying that the written document is not the
contract. The agreement between the parties is the contract, and to
limit it to the written words and to treat the parties' actual intent as
irrelevant is to invest the writing with a potency similar to what
primitive faith does. In fact, Wigmore had made the same substantive
point two generations earlier in 1904 in the first edition of his treatise
on evidence, when he wrote of the parol evidence rule that:
This principle assumes that, by some provision of law, or by the
parties' intent, the act effective in law is a single written memorial,
and that no parol act is to be regarded as of any effect for the
purpose....
In consequence of this principle of Integration, then, the question
is constantly presented whether a specific writing has become the
sole act material to the case; and this is purely a question 2of the
substantive law applicable to the kind of transaction involved. ('
Following his semantics discussion, Traynor crafted his own rule:
The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning
of a written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be
plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered evidence
is relevant to prove a meaning to2 which the language of the
instrument is reasonably susceptible.' 1
He justified this rule in language very similar to what Wigmore had
said in 1904:
Some courts have expressed the opinion that contractual obligations
are created by the mere use of certain words, whether or not there
was any intention to incur such obligations. Under this view,
contractual obligations flow, not from the intention of the parties,
but from the fact that they used certain magic words. Evidence of
the parties' intention therefore becomes irrelevant.
In this state, however, the intention of the parties as expressed in
the contract is the source of contractual rights and duties.'22
Despite the furor that Pacific Gas has spawned, a closer look at
Traynor's rule shows that it is, in fact, moderately conservative. In
Trident Judge Kozinski said that under Pacific Gas, "[i]f one side is
willing to claim that the parties intended one thing but the agreement
provides for another, the court must consider extrinsic evidence of
possible ambiguity."'2 3 At best, this description is incomplete. At
Semantics 43 (3d ed. 1963)).
120. 2 John Henry Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 1346, at 1634 (1st ed. 1904).
121. Pac. Gas, 442 P.2d at 644.
122. Id.
123. Trident Ctr. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1988).
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worst, it is misleading. The Traynor opinion does instruct the judge to
consider the proffered evidence, but the test of admissibility is
"whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which
the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible.'' 24 This
"reasonably susceptible" language makes the judge a gatekeeper, who
retains the power to withhold the extrinsic evidence from a jury.
Indeed, Professor Ralph James Mooney, in his article on the
conservative "new conceptualism" in contract law, cited several
examples of state courts retreating from the broad Restatement
(Second) position to what he viewed as the more conservative Pacific
Gas "reasonably susceptible" rule.25
Nonetheless, we know that there are many who find Pacific Gas
dangerous and unsettling. What, then, was Traynor's motive in
supposedly muddying the waters of contract interpretation?
According to Olivia and Louis Karlin, in their 1991 article, The
California Parol Evidence Rule, "Justice Traynor was clearly a man
with a mission. ' 126 And what was that mission? "[T]o undermine the
foundations of the parol evidence rule and stretch the rule's contours
beyond recognition.' 1 27 Why? Because "through a debilitated parol
evidence rule, the judge obtains freer reign to 'do justice.' It is this
desire to expand the scope of judicial inquiry and action that most
likely underlies Justice Traynor's opinion.' 121 Is this possible? Could
the sainted Roger Traynor have been conducting guerrilla warfare in
favor of free-wheeling judicial legislating? In a comprehensive article
on contract interpretation in California, Professor Harry Prince
criticized murky parol-evidence-rule-thinking of recent years and
suggested that courts admit when they are unable to figure out what
29
the parties to a contract intended, and simply try to do justice.
While Prince's intriguing argument supports the Karlins' view in one

124. Pac. Gas, 442 P.2d at 644 (emphasis added).
125. See Mooney, supra note 85, at 1159-71.
126. Karlin & Karlin, supra note 83, at 1368.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1370.
129. See Prince, supra note 15, at 649-50. Professor Prince was particularly
concerned with parol evidence rule cases involving technological change and
contracts entered into many years ago, where one party stood to get a windfall if a
possible but questionable interpretation was followed. See City of Manhattan Beach
v. Superior Court, 914 P.2d 160 (Cal. 1996) (suit for the reversion of unclear land
grant for a now obsolete railroad, brought by "laughing heirs" rounded up by
heirhunters who would have received fifty percent of the recovery); Lee v. Walt
Disney Co., No. B058897 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 1992) (unpublished opinion)
(involving a suit by Peggy Lee over VCR and DVD rights to "Lady and the Tramp,"
in which Disney made millions from these formats but arguably did not have to pay
royalties on them to Lee, who had provided both songs and voices for the movie); cf
Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 165-68 (N.Y. 1933)
(reinterpreting contract waiving rights to use of story in motion pictures, under good
faith principles, in light of development of sound).
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sense,3' his reasoning also indicates that courts have generally not
engaged in much social engineering under the guise of admitting
specious extrinsic evidence.
In fact, Roger Traynor was enough of a legal realist to call for
courts to be explicit in doing social engineering. Consider, for
example, his famous concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co.,13 written in 1944, shortly after he joined the California Supreme
Court. Escola was an exploding bottle case in which the majority
found for an injured waitress under reasoning that Richard Epstein
happily called "an heroic and tortured application of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine." '32 Justice Traynor agreed that the victim should
recover, but revealed how weak the res ipsa reasoning was under the
facts of that case, and instead argued for strict liability in products
cases such as Escola.133 His concurrence, of course, was adopted as
the law everywhere in the United States a generation later, but from
the beginning he called for courts to be honest and explicit about the
role that social values played in their reasoning process. This hardly
squares with the Machiavellian motives that the Karlins impute to
Traynor. It is just as probable that Traynor was saying what he really
meant: that words are not always reliable, and that the intention of the
parties is what makes a contract, not the words on a piece of paper.
This was not a radical idea when Traynor wrote Pacific Gas. We have
already seen what Wigmore wrote in 1904;11 4 in addition, Karl
Llewellyn had built much of the Uniform Commercial Code upon a
rejection of the plain
meaning rule 3 ' and upon a concept of the
'
"agreement in fact,"136
and by 1968, the Code had been adopted
130. Prince, supra note 15, at 640, 649.
131. 150 P.2d 436, 440-44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
132. Charles 0. Gregory, Harry Kalven, Jr. and Richard A. Epstein, Cases and
Materials on Torts 550 (3d ed.).
133. Escola, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J., concurring).
134. See supra text accompanying note 120.
135. See U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 1 (2000):
This Act rejects both the "lay-dictionary" and the "conveyancer's" reading
of a commercial agreement. Instead the meaning of the agreement of the
parties is to be determined by the language used by them and by their action,
read and interpreted in the light of commercial practices and other
surrounding circumstances. The measure and background for interpretation
are set by the commercial context, which may explain and supplement even
the language of a formal or final writing.
Id.
136. See, e.g., id. § 1-201(3) ("'Agreement' means the bargain of the parties in fact
as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including
course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as provided in this Act
(Sections 1-205 and 2-208)."); id. § 1-201(11) ("'Contract' means the total legal
obligation which results from the parties' agreement as affected by this Act and any
other applicable rules of law. (Compare 'Agreement.')"); id. § 2-202 (stating that the
terms of a written agreement may be supplemented by course of dealings, usages of
trade and course of performance); id. § 2-204 (stating that "[a] contract for sale of
goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by
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throughout the United States. So a straightforward doubt about plain
meaning and a straightforward rejection of contract as a piece of
paper rather than as the parties' actual agreement are both more
likely motivations than scheming on Traynor's part.
Well then, what about the idea that Traynor was simply impractical,

a "1960s judge[] citing moonbeam evidence," as the Wall Street

Journal put it,'37 or merely unaware of how much uncertainty he was

adding to contract predictability, as Judge Kozinski in Trident38 and

Justice Mosk in Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto39 both charged?
Given that Traynor served on the California Supreme Court from

1940 until 1970 and has a legacy that is well documented, I will pass on
the Wall Street Journal without further comment. The Kozinski and
Mosk charges have more substance, but are belied by the very terms
of the Pacific Gas test: "The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence
to explain the meaning of a written instrument is ...whether the
offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language
of the instrument is reasonably susceptible."' 4" As already noted, this
rule has the potential to keep extrinsic evidence from juries because
trial judges must find that the material is reasonably susceptible of the
meaning which the evidence is offered to support before admitting
it. 4 ' But the clearest proof that the Pacific Gas rule will not cause the

sky to fall comes from Trident itself. Professor Susan MartinDavidson reports that, on remand, the insurance company, against
which the extrinsic evidence was offered, successfully moved for
summary judgment, which was granted together with attorney's
fees.142 Far from being a naif about business, Traynor seems to have
walked a middle ground in producing a rule that is criticized from the
left as much as from the right.'4 3 It is ironic that his attempt to temper

both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract ...even though the
moment of its making is undetermined").
137. Crovitz, supra note 83, at 16, reprinted in Linzer, supra note 83, at 423; see
generally supra text accompanying notes 109-19.
138. See supra text accompanying note 82.
139. See supra text accompanying note 86.
140. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641,
644 (Cal. 1968).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
142. Martin-Davidson, supra note 32, at 4 n.22.
143. I am aware that Traynor's famous opinion in Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333
P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958) (holding a subcontractor to its unaccepted bid when the general
contractor relied on it in bidding on the prime contract), has been criticized as being
insensitive to the greater power that general contractors have over subcontractors.
See, e.g., Franklin M. Schultz, The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of Business Practice in
the Construction Industry, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 237 (1952) (arguing against what later
became the Drennan rule on this ground). Nonetheless, Drennan is described as
having been followed by "the overwhelming majority of courts that have considered
this type of case." Charles L. Knapp et al., Problems in Contract Law 251 (4th ed.
1999); accord 3 Eric Mills Holmes, Corbin On Contracts § 8.12, at 79 n.79 (Joseph M.
Perillo ed., 1996) (stating that Drennan has a "considerable following").
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Corbin's all-out attack on the parol evidence rule and plain meaning
in interpretation has become the lightning rod for criticism from
adherents to the traditional rigid rules.
IV. CORBIN'S WAY

Finally, we might look at the "pure Corbin" position: the parol
evidence rule never bars the use of extrinsic evidence to learn the
meaning of words, even if those words are contained in a fully
integrated document. This was incorporated into Section 214(c) of
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which permits extrinsic
evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements and negotiations to
be admitted to establish "the meaning of the writing, whether or not
integrated," and without a prior showing of ambiguity, either patent
or latent.'
Within the past dozen years or so, a number of state
supreme courts have adopted this position, either as a new rule of law
or as a continuation of existing law. Let us briefly look at three.
A. Corbin's Way: Washington
In Berg v. Hudesman,4 5 the Washington Supreme Court had before
it a question of the proper rent on a ninety-nine year ground lease.
The lease contained a fairly complicated formula, which included a
payment of ten percent of "net rentals received."'46 The term "net
rentals," in turn, was defined as gross rentals received from tenants
less a number of specified expenses paid by the ground lessee.'47 In
August of 1987 the landlord sued, claiming that the tenant had
underpaid the rent for several years, and the trial court granted the
landlord partial summary judgment, reasoning that the rental
provisions were clear and unambiguous.4 s The tenant moved to
vacate the order and offered affidavits supporting its argument that
reimbursements from its subtenants had to be excluded from gross
rental unless the expenses being reimbursed were themselves
deductible; the landlord rested on the words of the lease, which49
appeared to include all payments from subtenants as rental income.
The trial court granted final summary judgment for the landlord,
stating that the affidavits submitted by defendant "are not subject to
being considered, and, even if considered, do not alter or modify the

144. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214(c) (1981). Equally consistent with
Corbin's position are Sections 214(a) and (b) of the Second Restatement, permitting
extrinsic evidence to be used to establish whether a writing is integrated or not and
whether the integration is partial or complete. Id. § 214(a)-(b).
145. 801 P.2d 222 (Wash. 1990).
146. Id. at 225.
147. Id. at 224-25.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 225.
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clear and unambiguous language of Section 3 of the Lease.91 50 The
tenant appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed in part, modifying
the computation of gross rentals to carry out what it believed was the
intent of the drafter of the lease.151 From this, the landlord appealed
to the Supreme Court of Washington.
The Washington Supreme Court began its opinion by quoting
Corbin: "The cardinal rule with which all interpretation begins is that
'
its purpose is to ascertain the intention of the parties."152
The
Washington court then stated that every court should heed Corbin's
strong words that
it can hardly be insisted on too often or too vigorously that language
at its best is always a defective and uncertain instrument, that words
do not define themselves, that terms and sentences in a contract, a
deed, or a will do not apply themselves to external objects and
performances, that the meaning of such terms and sentences consists
of the ideas that they induce in the mind of some individual person
who uses or hears or reads them, and that seldom in a litigated case
do the words of a contract convey one 53identical meaning to the two
contracting parties or to third persons.
The Court then discussed the plain meaning rule and conceded that,
in the past, "[i]n following this rule, this court has held that only if a
contract is ambiguous on its face will the court look to evidence of the
parties' intent." '54 After listing several of the prominent critics of the
plain meaning rule (Corbin, Wigmore, Farnsworth, Calamari and
Perillo) and noting the rule's rejection by Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, the court said that it had not consistently applied
the plain meaning rule, and cited decisions going back as far as 1922 in
which it had allowed trial courts to consider surrounding
circumstances "not for the purpose of contradicting what is in the
1 55
agreement, but for the purpose of determining the parties' intent.
It then cited a number of out-of-state cases that supported the
"context rule" as opposed to the plain meaning rule. Among those
cited were Pacific Gas, as we might have expected, and, more
surprisingly, Admiral Builders, the Maryland case that Judge Buckley
had insisted rejected the Corbin approach and insisted upon a strictly
150. Id. (quotation omitted).
151. Id. at 226. The Supreme Court stated that the Court of Appeals erred because
the intent of the drafter was irrelevant unless it expressed the intent of the parties. Id.
at 226 n.1.
152. Id. (quoting Corbin, Interpretationof Words, supra note 2, at 162). Contrast
this passage with the words of Holmes, the supreme objectivist: "The law has nothing
to do with the actual state of the parties' mind. In contract, as elsewhere, it must go
by externals, and judge parties by their conduct." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The
Common Law 242 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963)(1881).
153. Berg, 801 P.2d at 227 (quoting 3 Corbin on Contracts 1960 ed., supra note 2, §
536, at 27-28).
154. Id. at 228.
155. Id.
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objective analysis of meaning."'
The Washington court then
concluded that the case at hand "presents a clear opportunity for this
court to resolve the long-standing confusion engendered by
inconsistent holdings in this area," 15 7 and announced a holding that
"extrinsic evidence is admissible as to the entire circumstances under
which the contract was made, as an aid in ascertaining the parties'
intent," and quoted and adopted Sections 212 and 214(c) of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.'58
The Berg court quoted at length from a 1944 Washington opinion, 15 9
which in turn relied on a 1915 decision,160 in holding that
parol evidence is admissible to show the situation of the parties and
the circumstances under which a written instrument was executed,
for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties and
properly construing the writing. Such evidence, however, is
admitted, not for the purpose of importing into a writing an
intention not expressed therein, but with the view of elucidating the
meaning of the words employed.' 6 1
Based on this history, the court said "[w]e thus reject the theory that
ambiguity in the meaning of contract language must exist before
evidence of the surrounding
circumstances is admissible. Cases to the
162
contrary are overruled."'
The court spent several pages wading through the lease and the
extrinsic evidence, apparently to show the courts below that there
were a number of ambiguities in the contract. But it concluded its
opinion with the following words:
Lest there be any doubt as to our holding, we expressly state that we
are not implicitly applying the "plain meaning rule." Whether or
not ambiguity is apparent from the face of a contract, evidence of
the circumstances of the making of the contract is admissible. We
reject the plain meaning rule and expressly adopt the context rule as
the applicable rule for ascertaining
the parties' intent and
63
interpreting written contracts.'

156. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 49-52 (describing Judge Buckley's
discussion of Admiral Builders).
157. Berg, 801 P.2d at 228-29.
158. Id. at 229.
159. Id. at 229-30.
160. Olsen v. Nichols, 149 P. 668 (Wash. 1915).
161. Berg, 801 P.2d at 229 (quoting J.W. Seavey Hop Corp. v. Pollock, 147 P.2d 310
(Wash. 1944)).
162. Id. at 230.
163. Id. at 234.
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B. Corbin's Way: Arizona

A similar reliance on Corbin's writings and reasoning can be found
in Taylor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,"M in which
the Arizona Supreme Court allowed extrinsic evidence to be admitted
to construe a release agreement of "any and all other contractual
claims." 6 ' The plaintiff argued that the release did not bar a claim
against an insurance company for bad faith.166 The trial court had
found the release ambiguous and admitted the extrinsic evidence, but
the Court of Appeals reversed a sizable jury verdict for the plaintiff
on the ground that the "four corners" of the agreement "clearly
release[d] all policy contract rights, claims, and causes of action that
Taylor has or may have against State Farm,"'6 7 and thus barred the
introduction of the extrinsic evidence. The Arizona Supreme Court,
in turn, reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment.
Taylor discussed the authorities, especially Corbin, for four pages, 6 '
and said that in fact Arizona had been committed to the Corbin
approach to the parol evidence rule since 1983.169 The decision
reaffirmed the Corbin approach, but interestingly considered at length
and ultimately approved of the Pacific Gas "reasonably susceptible"
language. 7 " The court closely analyzed the evidence, concluding that
there were three "reasonable, but conflicting, interpretations of the
language used in the agreement"'' and that, because the trial judge
had correctly found that the issue could not be decided as a matter of
law, it was correct to submit the question to the jury.'
Thus, in
contrast to some courts, the Arizona court did not use "reasonably
susceptible" to mean "clear" or "unassailable."
In a revealing
footnote, Chief Justice Feldman, author of the opinion, discussed the
critical question whether a bad faith claim would be within a release
of "any and all other contractual claims." ' 3 The Chief Justice wrote
that,
In the author's view, as a matter of doctrinal purity, a bad faith claim
is a cause of action for breach of contract to which, for various policy
reasons, a tort rather than a contract measure of damages is applied.
164. 854 P.2d 1134 (Ariz. 1993).

165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 1146.
Id.
Id. at 1137.
Id. at 1138-41. The court also cited an excellent article by an Arizona trial
judge, Robert 1. Gottsfield, Darner Motor Sales v. Universal Underwriters: Corbin,
Williston and the Continued Viability of the Parol Evidence Rule in Arizona, 25 Ariz.

St. L.J. 377 (1993). Taylor, 854 P.2d at 1138.
169. Taylor, 854 P.2d at 1139 ("Writing for a unanimous court in Smith v. Melson,

Inc., 121-22, 659 P.2d 1264, 1266-67 (Ariz. 1983), Chief Justice Holohan expressly
committed Arizona to the Corbin view of contract interpretation.").
170. Id. at 1140.
171. Id. at 1144.

172. Id. at 1145.
173. Id. at 1143.
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Thus, to this author, a release of contractual claims necessarily
releases a bad faith claim ....
[, but t]he object of contract
interpretation is not to satisfy a judge's compulsive devotion to
jurisprudential theory but, instead, "to determine
and make
74
effective the Intention of the ContractingParties."

Because the jury had found that the bad faith claim had not been
released, and this was supported by the extrinsic evidence of the
parties' intent, the Arizona Supreme Court left undisturbed the jury's
75
resolution in plaintiff's favor.
C. Corbin's Way: Alaska
Finally, let us move north to Alaska.'76 The Alaska Supreme Court,
for years one of the most inventive state courts, had taken so many
liberties with the parol evidence rule in the 1980s that it was seriously
contended that the rule was a "dead letter" in that state. 77 A series of
more restrictive decisions from the mid-eighties to the early nineties
led Professor Mooney, in his important 1995 article, to cite Alaska as
one of the states where the "new conceptualism in contract law" was
causing a shift back to the more conservative use of plain meaning and
to restrictions on extrinsic evidence. 7 8 About the same time, a
student note in the Alaska Law Review referred to the Alaska
Supreme Court's earlier "furtive move to the Corbin approach," and
welcomed its swing back, hoping, however, that the court would be
79
more explicit when it changed direction in the future.
A year later the court had before it a case with strong emotional
and political overtones, Municipality of Anchorage v. Gentile,"" a class
action arguing that a series of collective bargaining agreements
involving the police and firefighters of Anchorage had included an
unwritten understanding that benefits would vest at retirement and
174. Id. at 1143 n.5 (quoting the first of the rules of interpretation that Corbin
added to his treatise on the eve of his ninetieth birthday in what is now 3 Arthur L.
Corbin, Corbin On Contracts § 572B, at 64 (rev. ed. Supp. 2002)).
175. Id. at 1145.
176. Lest the reader think that loose versions of the parol evidence rule exist only
in states served by the Pacific Reporter, we might mention Isbrandtsen v. North
Branch Corp., 556 A.2d 81 (Vt. 1988), listed in Taylor as among the cases expressing
approval of the Corbin and the Restatement (Second) positions with respect both to
the use of extrinsic evidence even in the face of an apparent plain meaning, and to the
idea that the parol evidence rule does not bar the use of extrinsic evidence to
interpret a contract. Taylor, 854 P.2d at 1140-41.
Isbrandtsen does adopt this
approach, though it finds that there was no ambiguity and that "only one reasonable
interpretation exists" under the terms of the contract in question, despite the extrinsic
evidence. Isbrandtsen, 556 A.2d at 85.
177. See Mooney, supra note 85, at 1131.
178. Id. at 1148-50.
179. Leonard Marinaccio, III, Note, Out On Parol?:A Critical Examination of the
Alaska Supreme Court's Application of the Parol Evidence Rule, 111Alaska L. Rev.
405, 429 (1994).
180. 922 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1996).
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that retirees would never have their benefits reduced.18 The actual
language of the provision was "coverage under this provision may not
be diminished during the term of this agreement,"' 2 although the union
negotiators had unsuccessfully proposed language of permanent
vesting." 3 Nevertheless, there was evidence that assurances had been
given that the benefits would never be reduced, and internal
memoranda showed that the City's lawyers feared that Anchorage
was bound not to reduce the benefits.184 There was, however, contrary
testimony. In general, the vesting argument was supported by
testimony from retired politicians and negotiators who had taken part
in the earlier bargaining but did not have to pay for the benefits, and
opposed by current politicians faced with shortfalls and budget
deficits.""
The court's actual discussion of the law governing interpretation is
very short:
The goal of the court is to enforce the reasonable expectations of the
parties. In determining the intent of the parties the court looks to
the written contract as well as extrinsic evidence regarding the
parties' intent at the time the contract was made. The parties'
expectations are assessed by examining the language used in the
contract, case law interpreting similar language, and relevant
extrinsic18 6 evidence, including the subsequent conduct of the
parties.

The passage is not particularly remarkable, although it does indicate
that the court had not retreated from its earlier "furtive moves to the
Corbin approach." The trial court had found for the retirees. The
Alaska Supreme Court said that, while the interpretation of words is
usually viewed as a matter of law, reviewable de novo on appeal,
where the trial court relies on conflicting extrinsic evidence, it would
only reverse if the finding were clearly erroneous.'87 Using this
standard, it upheld the award.'
Although the Anchorage case does not mention Corbin or the
Second Restatement, it allows extrinsic evidence to be considered
without a finding of ambiguity and despite its own characterization of
the agreement's actual language as a compromise. The decision
181. Id. at 255.
182. Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
183. Id. at 253 n.1. The language in the agreements is described by the court as
"the parties' compromise." Id.
184. Id. at 254.
185. Id. at 252-55.
186. Id. at 255-56 (citations omitted). In a footnote attached to this passage the
court cited a 1979 decision noting that it did not require a preliminary finding of
ambiguity before evaluating extrinsic evidence. Id. at 256 n.5.
187. Id. at 256.
188. Id. at 258; cf supra text accompanying notes 59-61 (addressing Hershon's
discussion of review and the court's relative willingness to interfere).
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deferred to the trial court, which had adopted a meaning discerned
from extrinsic evidence. It seems fair to include the opinion among
the most free-wheeling views of the parol evidence and plain meaning
rules.
D. Corbin's Why
Either expressly or by pretty clear implication, cases such as
Anchorage, Taylor, and Berg embody the views of Arthur Corbin and
the Second Restatement, itself strongly influenced by Corbin.x9 And
once again moving forward to give us their view of Corbin's agenda
are Olivia and Louis Karlin. We are told that Corbin did not believe
that words have any stable meaning, and was a literary nihilist. "The
critical school most congenial to Professor Corbin's view of language
is literary deconstruction... [except that l]iterary deconstruction
probably does not even go so far as Professor Corbin does."''90
Corbin was, in fact, a conservative man who supported Barry
Goldwater for President in 1964."l' He was writing about the
flexibility of language before Jacques Derrida was born, and he wrote
very clearly, in 1960, a section of his treatise entitled "Interpretation
Requires the Weighing of Evidence, Not its Exclusion."19' 2 Corbin
fully accepted the idea that the uncertainties of language did not make
all writing indeterminate, and warned against "the too ready
acceptance of flimsy and prejudiced testimony motivated by
subsequently realized self-interest.' 1 93 What disturbed him was
denying everyone, both judge and jury, a chance to examine the
extrinsic evidence, and to accept or reject such evidence on its own
merits. As he wrote in an accompanying footnote, "[t]here are indeed
cases in which the words of a written contract are such as to outweigh
the extrinsic evidence offered by a party. But all language requires
interpretation and no language is 'compelling' until it has been
94
interpreted."1
The Arizona Supreme Court, in a passage based on Corbin,
answered the "literary nihilism" argument implicitly, and the Kozinski
Trident criticism of Pacific Gas explicitly:
We too would recoil if Pacific Gas meant that mere complexity
required a finding of ambiguity or that courts must listen to wholly
189. Robert Braucher, Interpretationand Legal Effect in the Second Restatement of
Contracts, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 13 (1981).
190. Karlin & Karlin, supra note 83, at 1379-80.
191. See Corbin's letter to Robert Braucher of October 29, 1964 about the
impending 1964 presidential election, in Joseph M. Perillo, Twelve Letters From
Arthur L. Corbin to Robert Braucher,50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 755, 774 (1993).
192. 3 Corbin On Contracts 1960 ed., supra note 2, § 542A. The idea is carried
forth by Professor Margaret Kniffin in her revision of Corbin's chapter on
interpretation. See Kniffin, supra note 2, § 24.7, at 39.
193. 3 Corbin On Contracts 1960 ed., supra note 2, § 542A.
194. Id. at 129 n.85.30.
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unpersuasive extrinsic evidence to create ambiguity where words are
clear beyond dispute. What this means, at least in Arizona, is that
the parol evidence rule does not apply to exclude evidence unless
the evidence varies or contradicts the agreement. But the court
must first decide what the agreement says and, as a preliminary
matter, must decide if it reasonably could be interpreted in different
ways, given the language and the factual context surrounding the
making of the agreement. Admittedly, the process is not without
risk, but we believe the game is worth the candle. After all, the
purpose is to produce the contract result the parties intended, not
that which the judge intends. Some words are clear beyond dispute.
Some may mean one thing to the judge but could have meant
something else to the parties. It is the latter meaning that is
important.19 5
V. PLAIN MEANING FROM MA FERGUSON TO H.L.A. HART
Ma Ferguson, the first woman governor in American history,
usually deferred to her husband Pa, who had been obliged to give up
the Texas governorship upon his being sent to prison. At one time, so
the story goes, Pa was out of town and Ma was asked to sign a bill
allowing schools near the Rio Grande to teach in Spanish. Ma vetoed
the bill, saying "English was good enough for Jesus. It's good enough
for them."
The same attitude often underlies faith in the plain meaning of
words, whether from people as unlettered as Ma Ferguson or from
federal judges such as James Buckley. Nonetheless, not everyone who
believes in "plain meaning" is ignorant or simplistic. Holmes and
Williston, the supreme objectivists, fully acknowledged that "plain
meaning" is an oversimplification but still viewed the reasonable
observer's understanding as controlling. And serious philosophers
have debated the existence of "core meanings," particularly in the
famous debate between H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller,'9 6 neither of
whom was a simpleton.
In April of 1957, Hart, then Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford,
gave a Holmes Lecture at Harvard entitled Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morality,97 discussing whether "higher law"
concepts of morality belonged in the law, and whether "what is and
what ought to be are somehow indissolubly fused or inseparable."' 9 8
Hart, a great positivist, denied this thesis. The following year, Lon
Fuller, Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence at Harvard,
answered Hart in an article entitled Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A
195. Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 854 P.2d 1134, 1140 n.2 (Ariz. 1993)
(citation omitted).
196. See Hart, supra note 17; Fuller, supra note 16.
197. See Hart, supra note 17.
198. Id. at 594.
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Reply to Professor Hart.199 Their underlying dispute is of great
importance both in its own right and as an intellectual artifact of the
time. The basic issue is relevant to our discussion, but most on our
point is their insightful discussion of interpretation.
In the course of his lecture Hart gave an illustration, almost en
passant,involving a rule forbidding vehicles in a park:
A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the public park.
Plainly this forbids an automobile, but what about bicycles, roller
skates, toy automobiles? What about airplanes? Are these, as we
say, to be called "vehicles" for the purpose of the rule or not? If we
are to communicate with each other at all, and if, as in the most
elementary form of law, we are to express our intentions that a
certain type of behavior be regulated by rules, then the general
words we use-like "vehicle" in the case I consider-must have
some standard instance in which no doubts are felt about its
application. There must be a core of settled meaning, but there will
be, as well, a penumbra of debatable cases in which words are
neither obviously applicable nor obviously ruled out. These cases
will each have some features in common with the standard case; they
will lack others or be accompanied by features not present in the
standard case.... [In these penumbral cases] someone must take
the responsibility of deciding that words do or do not cover some
case in hand
with all the practical consequences involved in this
02 1
decision.

0

Hart conceded, indeed insisted, that these "problems of the
penumbra" had to be decided "not mechanically but in the light of
aims, purposes, and policies."2 1 He also maintained that "the hard
core of settled meaning is law in some centrally important sense and
112
that even if there are borderlines, there must first be lines. 0
Fuller, in his reply, included an eight-page section called "The
Problem of Interpretation: The Core and the Penumbra. 112 3 Fuller
described Hart as arguing that communication is possible only
because words have "standard instances" or "core meaning[s]," that a
word should be regarded "as embracing its 'standard instance"' except
in unusual circumstances, and that only in penumbral areas was a
judge forced to consult his4 notions of what "ought to be" in order to
' 2
decide what the rule "is. 0
Fuller responded:
If I have properly interpreted Professor Hart's theory as it affects
the "hard core," then I think it is quite untenable. The most obvious
199. See Fuller, supra note 16.
200. Hart, supra note 17, at 607.

201. Id. at 607, 614.
202. Id. at 614. 1 cannot do Professor Hart's thirty-seven page lecture justice in a
one-page summary. It is well worth reading.
203. Fuller, supra note 16, at 661.
204. Id. at 662,663.
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defect of his theory lies in its assumption that problems of
interpretation typically turn on the meaning of individual words....
Even in the case of statutes, we commonly have to assign meaning,
not to a single word, but to a sentence, a paragraph, or a whole page
or more of text. Surely a paragraph does not have a "standard
instance" that remains constant whatever the context in which it
appears. If a statute seems to have a kind of "core meaning" that we
can apply without a too precise inquiry into its exact purpose, this is
because we can see that, however one might formulate the
205 precise
objective of the statute, this case would still come within it.
To illustrate his point Fuller proposed an incomplete sentence

beginning "All improvements must be promptly reported to

..

"206

He continued: "Professor Hart's theory seems to assert that even if we
have only this fragment before us we can safely construe the word
'improvement' to apply to its 'standard instance,' though we would
have to know the rest of the sentence before we could deal
intelligently with 'problems of the penumbra.""'2 7 But, said Fuller, the
standard meaning of "improvement" varies, depending on whether
the object of the sentence is "the head nurse," "the Town Planning
Authority," or "the Principal of the School."2 °8 To understand what
"improvement" means, "[w]e must, in other words, be sufficiently
capable of putting ourselves in the position of those who drafted the
rule to know what they thought 'ought to be.'' It is in the light of this
'ought' that we must decide what the rule 'is'. "209
Fuller then made what seems to me to be an insightful point:
Throughout his whole discussion of interpretation, Professor Hart
seems to assume that it is a kind of cataloguing procedure. A judge
faced with a novel situation is like a library clerk who has to decide
where to shelve a new book.... Surely the judicial process is
something more than a cataloguing procedure. The judge does not
discharge his responsibility when he pins an apt diagnostic label on
the case. He has to do something about it, to treat it, if you will. It
is this larger responsibility which explains why interpretive problems
almost never turn on a single word, and also why lawyers for
generations have found the putting of imaginary borderline cases
penumbra," but in order to know where the
useful, not only "on
21 the
penumbra begins. 0
Fuller concluded his discussion of interpretation by saying that "the
theory of meaning implied in Professor Hart's essay seems to me to
have been rejected by three men who stand at the very head of
modern developments in logical analysis: [Ludwig] Wittgenstein,
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 662-63.
Id. at 664-65.
Id. at 665.
Id.
Id. at 666.
Id.
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[Bertrand] Russell, and [Alfred North] Whitehead.""
After giving
instances from Wittgenstein and Russell, he concluded by saying that
"Whitehead explains the appeal that 'the deceptive identity of the
repeated word' has for modern philosophers; only by assuming some
linguistic constant (such as the 'core of meaning') can validity be
claimed for procedures of logic which of necessity move the word
'
from one context to another."212
To be sure, Hart and Fuller were discussing interpretation more as
a paradigm for their debate over morality's place in law, and they
were using statutes rather than contracts as their illustrations. But
Fuller's responses to Hart seem to make an effective response to even
the sophisticated version of plain meaning that Hart posited under the
rubrics "core meaning" and "standard instance." Skepticism about an
apparently strained interpretation is one thing, but to treat the
operation as different in kind from "the problems of the penumbra" is
to draw an artificial distinction, based on an assumption of core
meaning that, while not as egregious as Ma Ferguson's assumptions
about Jesus, is just as false.
This artificial distinction is illustrated by another sophisticated
version of plain meaning analysis, one utilized by Judge Richard
Posner in AM International,Inc. v. Graphic Management Associates,
Inc.2" 3 Posner agreed that the notion of plain meaning was an
oversimplification, and that courts should admit extrinsic evidence to
show an ambiguity. He argued, however, that only "objective"
evidence should be admitted:
By "objective" evidence we mean evidence of ambiguity that can be
supplied by disinterested third parties: evidence that there was more
than one ship called Peerless, or that a particular trade uses "cotton"
in a nonstandard sense .... "Objective" evidence is admissible to
demonstrate that apparently clear contract language means
something different from what it seems to mean; "subjective"
evidence is inadmissible for this purpose.214

Not only does Posner's system require a distinction based on the
judge deciding that some expression is obvious in meaning, but it also
sets up an evidentiary test that is more stringent than those in other
areas of the law or even areas of the parol evidence rule. For
instance, we would not need to use "objective evidence" to show that
an oral condition had not been included in an integrated writing.2" 5
While Posner's system is much more sophisticated than the ordinary
plain meaning rule, it still carries with it a distrust of those who try to
211. Id. at 669.
212. Id.
213. 44 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 1995).
214. Id. at 575.
215. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 217 (1979); 3 Corbin On Contracts
1960 ed., supra note 2, § 589.
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vary the written word.
Corbin was well aware that normally words mean what we all think
they mean, but like Fuller, he argued that only when words were
heard in context, which might include evidence from outside the
document in which the words appeared, could they be fully
understood. To be sure, the more unlikely the explanation and the
more unbelievable the circumstances, the less likely we are to accept
the unusual-or even egregious-meaning.
In Corbin's famous
words,
The more bizarre and unusual an asserted interpretation is, the
more convincing must be the testimony that supports it. Just when
the court should quit listening to testimony that white is black and
that a dollar is fifty cents is a matter for sound judicial discretion and
common sense. Even these things may be true for some purposes.
As long as the court is aware that there may be doubt and ambiguity
and uncertainty in the meaning and application of agreed language,
it will welcome testimony as to antecedent agreements,
communications,
and other factors that may help to decide the
216
issue.
VI. THE DISCOMFORT OF UNCERTAINTY
What is really bothersome about the Corbin/Second Restatement
approach to plain meaning and parol evidence is that it is unsettling.
It is easy to poke fun at young writers who overstate their case or at
federal judges, such as Alex Kozinski, who set up straw men for
Federalist Society audiences, but we cannot ignore Stanley Mosk, a
highly respected justice who has stuck to his liberal beliefs for thirty
years, even as recall elections pushed his California Supreme Court
far to the right. It was Stanley Mosk, we remember, who dissented in
Delta Dynamics, saying that "[t]he written word, heretofore deemed
immutable, is now at all timees [sic] subject to alteration by selfserving recitals based upon fading memories of antecedent events.
This, I submit, is a serious impediment to the certainty required in
commercial transactions." '17
This is not a foolish criticism, but Justice Mosk builds on clay in
asserting that the written word is immutable. It simply is not; consider
the changes in the meaning of the phrase "all men are created equal"
between July 4, 1776 and the present. Certainly we can look to
context. When "two experienced businessmen.., both represented
by competent counsel"21 are involved, we have much greater reason
216. 3 Corbin On Contracts 1960 ed., supra note 2, § 579, at 420-21 (footnote
omitted).
217. Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto, 446 P.2d 785, 789-90 (Cal. 1968) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
218. See Justice Mosk's full quotation, supra text accompanying note 86. Of
course, Trident also comes to mind.
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for skepticism than when an Italian stall-keeper is dealing with office
building managers.2" 9 Several writers argue that we either should or
already do raise and lower our skepticism based on categories of
Personally, I would rather base my
contracts and of parties.22
reaction on the specific facts; who the parties are and what kind of
contract is involved are part of the context, as much as the words used
and their dictionary definitions. Even in a family transaction perhaps
done without lawyers,221 there can be room for distrust of a far-fetched
story.
Thus there are some reasoned answers to Justice Mosk. In the end,
though, we have a choice between greater certainty, with occasional
injustices, and greater concern about what the parties actually
intended, with occasional chicanery. I think we should opt for the
parties' intentions, discerned from their words, read in the context of
all relevant evidence, extrinsic or not. Yes, we lose some security,
some peace of mind, some belief in the sanctity of the written word,
but on the whole we gain truth and individual dignity at a cost to form
and rules and certainty. That is a cost that I am willing to pay. And so
was Corbin. At the age of ninety he wrote,
What then is "the law"? And is there no certainty in "language"?
Are there not rules of law "fixed and settled" by which judges as
well as other men are bound, expressed in words that are "plain and
clear" with one true and "objective" meaning? A longtime
researcher must reply that there are no such "rules" and no such
"words." Nevertheless, the "law" consists of "rules," an increasing
multitude of them as time goes on. They are not to be scorned
merely because they are "tentative working rules," growing and
changing with the conditions of human life, and with the developing
mores of mankind. Without them the world would be a chaotic and
guideless world, with every man acting in accordance with his own
vagrant emotion and desire.... Therefore, every student, writer,
and judge has a responsibility of his own. He must make a choice
among "authorities," among "rules," and
222 among interpretations of
the words by which a rule is expressed.
Making that choice is not easy. Formalism of the kind found in
219. See Gianni v. R. Russell & Co., 126 A. 791, 792 (Pa. 1924) (holding that the
building manager's alleged oral promise to give the stall-keeper the exclusive right to
sell soda water in exchange for his not selling tobacco was inadmissible because not
included in written lease).
220. See Posner, supra note 38, for such a suggestion. In an influential article,
Robert Childres and Stephen J. Spitz argued that courts do this in parol evidence
cases sub silentio. Robert Childres & Stephen J. Spitz, Status in the Law of Contract,
47 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1972); see also Martin A. Lawrence, Comment, The Parol
Evidence Rule in Wisconsin: Status In the Law of Contract, Revisited, 1991 Wis. L.
Rev. 1071 (confirming the Childres and Spitz thesis).
221. See Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
222. Arthur L. Corbin, Sixty-Eight Years at Law, 13 U. Kan. L. Rev. 183, 194-95
(1964).
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plain meaning and an "objectivist" parol evidence rule is much easier
to carry out than weighing context, credibility, linguistic sensibility,
and the many other factors that can go into an interpretation of words
that may or may not mean what we think they mean. It is comforting
to live in a world of plain meaning. But that world just isn't real.
Rather than indulging in a fantasy of certainty, we should opt for a
world of reality, however untidy it may be.

Notes & Observations

